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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH in the 
interest of 
KENNETH EUGENE MARQUEZ Case No. 14571 
A person under eighteen 
years of age. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE APPELLANT 
WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY FOUNDATION THAT SUCH 
PRINTS WERE TAKEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND JUVENILE COURT RULES. 
II. DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN DECLARING FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE 
APPELLANT ADMISSABLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
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III. EVEN AFTER DECLARING THE ADMISSABILITY OF 
IV. 
v. 
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE OF THE APPELLANT UNDER 
THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY 
RULE, DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN NOT RE-
QUIRING SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION UNDER THE 
EXCEPTION ITSELF. 
DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN ADMITTING FINGER-
PRINT RECORDS OF THE APPELLANT WITHOUT REQUIR-
ING SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AS TO THE AUTHENTI-
CITY OF THE RECORDS. 
DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON IN-
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Second Distric: 
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated 
April 12, 1976, committing Kenneth Eugene Marquez, a juvenil' 
to the Utah State Industrial School. Cammi trnent occurred 
subsequent to an adjudicatory hearing conducted March 18, io• 
at which appellant was found guilty of the offenses of burgl' 
and theft. 
h . t d on Nove:: T e offenses charged were allegedly cornnnt e 
2 1975 . . . " 11 area 1 , at a single-family dwelling in the Ave1· es 
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of Salt Lak° City. According to the testimony of the investi-
c;;;tir.g polic~ offic",::- and the O\·mer of the home, access was 
c;air.ed by ~ear.s cf a forced entry through a back door to the 
nouse. The house was entered and several items of personal 
property were reported missing from the living area of the 
house. The only window to an unconnected cellar of the house 
was reported by the cwner to have been found by him with the 
glass unbro~en and in its permanent frame lying on the floor 
of the cellar. This finding was concurrent with discovery 
of the burglary and theft of the upstairs portion of the house. 
No property was discovered missing fron the cellar, nor was 
e~try to the upstairs portion of the house possible from inside 
the cellar. 
Two days later, on November 4, a latent fingerprint was 
lifted from the cellar window by the Salt Lake City Police. 
(State's Exhibit 2). The police officer who lifted his print 
testified that the window had been re? laced in the cellar wall, 
contrary to previous police instructions to owner of the home. 
No testimony was preser..ted in explanation of when or by whom 
the cellar window was replaced. One investigating officer had 
l' !Jc"'-Vi:-usly testified that he advised the victim on November 2, 
the day cf the burglary, not to move the window until the crime 
e:: lab technician was able to process it. 
At trial, the only evidence introduced by the State against 
~e appellant was testimony by Officer Bill D. Simpson, a techni-
cion in the, Ide>ntification Division of the Salt Lake City Police 
-3-
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Department. Officer Sir.?50n testified that one latent~ 
was taken by him on No'l9c".lber 4, 1974 from th<" outside Siirfa 
of the window to the cellar which, again, had no inside c'~'. 
tion to the living portion of the home, that the latent p: 
was then compared to a fir.gerprint card which reportedly ho' 
been in the possession of the Salt Lake City Police Deparu;,, 
since 1973, and that the card purportedly identified the p:: 
as belonging to the appellacit. (State's Exhibit 1) Mr. Sfr· 
testified that the latent print from the window was coIT1para:: 
to one of the prints on file. (State's Exhibit 3) No furt:. 
evidence of any kind was introduced by the State against tJ' 
appellant. 
Although timely objection by defense counsel was mac' 
as to the lack of founca ti on showing compliance with statut,,: 
provisions and juvenile court rules governing the fingM~c 
of juveniles and as to the conpetency of the fingerprint er:: 
its elf, such obj ec ti ens were overruled. Defense counsel als 
moved to dismiss the case based upon insufficient evidence t 
support a determination that the appellant was guilty of bic:: 
or theft. Counsel's Motion was denied. 
Appellant was found guilty of burglary and theft ano 
subsequently committed to the Utah State Industrial School. 
INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION 
Where a court is ccr.sidering a delinquency charge ou: 
t . . ·le cour: o the special procedures established by the Juven 1 · 
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and Rules which pointedly state that such proceedings are not 
criminal in nature, there is grave danger of injustice in the 
elimination of the usual safeguards surrounding a criminal trial. 
43 MR 2d 1130. In this vein, Dean Wigmore in his Treatise 
on Evidence, Vol. 5.Jd ed § 1400, has said: 
The procedure devised for juvenile courts 
is apt and enlightened. Nevertheless, 
the promoters of that legislation in their 
enthusiasm for its benefits and their 
determination to eliminate the conditions 
of the usual criminal court, have gone to 
the borderline of prudence in their 
iconoclasm .... 
During th~ past decade the United States Supreme Court 
has determined in three cases the boundaries of constitutional 
rights afforded children who come within the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court, and it is important that those be acknowledged 
here at the outset. Kent v. United States, 383 U S 541 (1966), 
In Re Gault, 387 U S 1 (1967), In Re Winship, 397 U S 583 (1970). 
Although these landmark cases are well known, the principles 
of those decisions are set forth herein because of the collective 
mandate they set forth for provision of due process protections 
in delinquency proceedings parallel to those involved in adult 
criminal proceedings. 
In Kent v. u.s., supra, the transfer of jurisdiction 
from Juvenile Court to the adult court of a 16 year old boy 
Was held illegal. The Court decried the long, procedurally 
irregular history of the case and reasoned that denial to a 
iuve>nile of procedural protections available to an adult could 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not be justified by any of the special protections allegedfy 
provided by the juvenile system under the doctrine of "par'r· 
patriae." The court relied heavily on the transfer statut': 
of the District of Columbia but clearly spoke in broad instr;_ 
terms of the right of the juvenile to procedural protections. 
In Re Gault, supra, expanded and clarified the genera: 
ruling of Kent, supra, and unequivocably held that wlthin th; 
Juvenile Court system the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment in delinquency proceedings require: (1) the givi"c 
of adequate and timely notice of the charges against the juv': 
(2) notice that the child is entitled to be represented by cc. 1 
(3) that the privileges against self-incrimination afforded 
by the Fifth Amendment apply in juvenile proceedings, and (41 
that a child involved in an adversary proceeding has the rig'.: 
to confront and cross examine witnesses as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment. The Gault holding has been the foundation 
of juvenile delinquency proceedings since 1967. 
The standard by which a juvenile may be deemed guilty 
of a delinquency charge was determined in In Re Winship, ~ 
The standard established there was "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt",that required in adult criminal proceedings. Here the 
court refused to accept the argument that a juvenile proceedr 
which could result in punishment through confinement in an i:, 
· · we~~ tution was not criminal and that due process protections 
therefore unnecessary. 
-6-
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,, 
, .. 
Th~ court rPasoned: 
"Civil labels and good intentions do 
not ther:tselves obviate the need for 
criminal due process safeguards in 
juvenile courts. 397 U S at 365. 
With these specified constitutional guarantees identified, 
the extension of applicable rules of evidence to juveniles in 
adjudicatory settings as demanded by due process is clear. With 
the exception of the right to a jury trial enjoyed by adults, 
the juvenile delinquency adjudication must, to be consistent with 
the Supreme Court Opinions, be conducted just as an adult criminal 
trial. 
As stated in People v. Fitzger1ld, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 
N.E. 584 (1927), 
"A child who commits an act which would 
be burglary or larceny in an adult, may 
be tried in the children's court and con-
victed and sent away ... The Act, however, 
must be proved; and it must be proved by 
some kind of evidence There must be a 
trial; the charge against the child can-
not be sustained upon mere hearsay or 
surmise; the child must first have com-
mitted the act of burglary or of larceny 
before it can be convicted of being a 
delinquent child. The act remains the 
same, and the proof of the act is equally 
necessary whether we call it burglary, 
larceny or delinquency. The name may 
change the result; it cannot change the 
facts. 
Utah recognizes the applicability of evidentiary safe-
'' guards in juvenile proceedings. As set forth in Rule 2 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence (effective July 1, 1971), the application 
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of the rules in judicial proceedings is defined as folki·is: 
Except to the extent to which they may 
be relaxed by other procedural rule or 
statute applicable to the specific sit-
uation, these rules shall apply in every 
proceeding, both criminal and civil, 
conducted by or under the supervision 
of a court, in which evidence is pro-
duced. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence are clearly those applicab: 
to the case herein as there are no provisions in the Juvenil' 
Court Act to limit or modify their application in delinquenc 
adjudications. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUVE:HLE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDE:lCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF 
THE ACCUSED WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION 
THAT SUCH FINGERPRINTS WERE TAKEN IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH STATUTORY PRO-
VISIONS AND JUVENILE COURT RULES. 
Two sets of fingerprints identified as belonging tot. 
appellant were introduced at trial. The fingerprint card he: 
by the Salt Lake City Police Department since 1973 was admit: 
' ' ' l 
over defense counsel's objection that there was 1nsuff1cieu 
foundation laid by the state to determine if the prints tafi' 
in 1973 were taken ar.d held by the police in compliance with 
the Utah statute goverr.ing the taking of fingerprints of j~ 
(Transcript, P.20). · erpr' The record indicates that the f i~ 
-8-
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card used as a comparison with a latent print found on an outside 
cellar window of the burglarized home provided the only basis 
for a determination of identification and guilt of the appellant. 
BecausP no foundation was laid by the State to assure 
compliance with Section 55-10-116 and Rule 39, Utah Juvenile 
court Rules of Practice and Procedure (hereafter U.J.C.R.P.P.), 
admission of State's Exhibit No. 1 was reversible error. 
Section 55-10-116 U.C.A. (1953) governs the fingerprinting 
of juveniles. The statute provides: 
... Without the consent of the (juvenile 
court) Judge, no fingerprints shall be 
taken of any child taken into custody 
unless the case is transferred for cri-
minal proceedings. 
No transfer for criminal proceedings was initiated against 
the appellant herein. Therefore, in accordance with Section 
55-10-116, the fingerprints taken in 1973 are inadmissible with-
out proper foundation that such prints were obtained legally 
as the result of obtaining judicial consent. If there is insuffi-
cient foundation to prove the legality of the taking of the 
appellant's prints, such prints must be presumed to have been 
illegally obtained and therefore are inadmissible as the fruits 
of an illegal act by the police. 
There is no recognized Utah case law on this question. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled on the admiss-
ability of fingerprint evidence. In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U 8 721 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that all evidence obtained 
-9-
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illegally, including fingerprints, is inadmissible in a ster. 
court. The opinion states: 
Our decision recognizes no exception to 
the rule that illegally seized evidence 
is inadmissible at trial however relevant 
the seized evidence may be as an item of 
proof .... To make an exception for ille-
gally seized evidence which js trustworthy 
would fatally undermine [the sanction to 
redress and deter overreaching conduct 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment]. 
The Utah Juvenile Court has promulgated administrativ' 
Rules relating to the means by which police agencies may ob:' 
consent of the juvenile court to take a juvenile's fingM~~ 
Rule 39 UJCRPP embodies Section 55-10-116 U .C .A. (1953) and 
was originally modified by general order No. 3, dated May 4, 
1966, which specified those circumstances under which the cc 
of a juvenile court judge is implied. General order No. J s: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Judges of the 
Utah State Juvenile Court that duly appointed 
and acting law enforcement officers in the State 
of Utah may take the fingerprints of any person 
under the age of eighteen years, which such 
officer has lawfully taken into custody: 
1. When such person has committed one of the 
following acts: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Any offense which would be a felony 
if committed by an adult. 
Any offense that would be petit 
larceny if committed by an adult. 
Any offense of depriving a motor 
vehicle owner of possession. 
Any offense involving a sexual 
exhibition. 
Running away from home without 
the consent of parents or guardian. 
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2. In any other case when such person has 
been lawfully taken into custody upon suf-
ficient evidence tending to connect said 
pPrsor, with the commission of an offense 
that would be a crime if committed by an 
adult, and fingerprints are reasonably 
necessary for comparison with latent 
prints obtained at the crime scene to 
further establish that said person per-
petrated the offense or that he is innocent 
of the offense. 
During the trial of the appellant the court refused to 
make a determination as to whether general order no. 3 applied 
for foundation purposes to the fingerprints in question or whether 
Rule 39 as amended in March 1975 was applicable. 
The 1975 amendment reads: 
RULE 39. Fingerprinting Persons under Eighteen 
Years of Age. 
A juvenile may not be fingerprinted without 
the express permission of a Judge of the Juvenile 
Court except that consent is hereby given in 
accordance with this rule in the following cases: 
1. 
2. 
If the juvenile is 14 years or older and 
is taken into custody and ref erred to the 
Juvenile Court for allegedly committing 
a criminal act which would be a felony if 
committed by an adult. Said prints may 
be filed by law enforcement agencies. If 
the Court does not find that the child 
committed the alleged felony, the finger-
print card and all copies of the finger-
prints shall be destroyed by the law 
enforcement agency, or upon request of 
the Juvenile Court, shall be delivered to 
the Juvenile Court for the purpose of 
destroying said prints. 
If latent fingerprints are found during 
the investigation of a criminal offense 
and the law enforcement officer has 
reason to believe that they are those of 
the juvenile in custody, he may finger-
print the juvenile regardless of age or 
- 11 -
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offense for purpOSPS of immediate compari-
son with the latent fingerprints. If the 
comparison is negative the fing,Jrprint card 
and otho.r copies of the fing(erprints takf'n 
shall be immediately destroyed. If the 
comparison is positive and the juv<"nile 
is under 14 years of age and ref erred to 
the Court, the fingerprint card and other 
copies of the fingerprints shall be deli-
vered to the Court for disposition. If 
the juvenile is not referred to Court, thf' 
prints shall be immediately destroyed by 
the law enforcement agency, or upon re-
quest cf the Juvenile Court, delivered to 
the Juvenile Court for the purpose of 
destroying the prints. 
3. If the Juvenile Court finds that a 
juvenile 14 or more years of age has 
committed a felony, the prints may be 
retained in the local police file 
and copies sent to the State Bureau 
of Criminal Identification, provided 
that said bureau and local police 
agency shall insure that no copies of 
said fingerprints shall be delivered 
or sent to any other agency or indi-
vidual without the express permission 
of the Juvenile Court and shall main-
tain said prints in a separate juvenile 
file. However, law enforcement officers 
and staff of the bureau may have access 
to the fingerprints for comparison pur-
poses. 
4. Under no circumstance shall copies of 
the fingerprints be sent to the Federal 
Bureau of Identification without the 
express permission of the Juvenile Court. 
In those instances where the juvenile in 
custody does not fall within the above exceptions 
and the law enforcement officer deems it advis-
able to have the juvenile fingerprinted, appli-
cation for such consent sh~ll be made by the 
officer or official who propo-~s to take the 
fingerprints with the reasons set forth. 
-12-
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The safeguards and procedures set out in these rules, 
whichever is applicable, are very clear and specific, as they 
should be. The Juvenile Court in promulgating these rules was 
pressing the limits of perrnissable delegation of legislatively 
mandated responsibilities by providing a mechanism that allows 
police officers to fingerprint juveniles without obtaining the 
specific consent of the Juvenile Court Judge. The dangers that 
this delegation may be abused if not closely scrutinized and 
jealously monitored by the Juvenile Court is obvious. The only 
means available is that requested by defense counsel here - a 
foundation laid by the State showing that the rules had been 
complied with in the taking and keeping of appellant's finger-
prints. 
The issue here is thus not which set of rules is appli-
cable. Rather, the legality of the taking of the prints through 
foundation evidence must be shown under either rule, since the 
same purpose is effected by both. Further, Rule 21 U.J.C.R.P.P. 
(1974) requires that only evidence that is "competent •.. shall 
be admitted." To be admissible as competent evidence, the state 
must sustain the burden of showing, through adequate foundation, 
that the comparison prints were obtained in compliance with 
Section 55-10-116 and Rule 39 U.J.C.R.P.P. 
It is clear from the trial transcript that absolutely 
no foundation showing compliance- with the forgoing statute or 
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rules was laid by the State or required by the Juvf,nil" Ccu: 
(Transcript beginning at Page 20). The Court thus admittrd 
the comparative fingerprint card into evic1°nce without assu: 
that the protections embodied within the statute and rul~s :. 
afforded the appellant. The admission of the prints int0 ; 
was reversible error and a denial of Due Process of Law as c. 
anteed by Article I, Sec. 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
II. THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN DECLARING FINGERPRINT RECORDS 
ADMISSABLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
The state was allowed, over counsel's objection, toa. 
the comparative fingerprints purportedly of appellant under: 
Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Rule 63(1J: 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The substance of this rule and exc;: 
is: 
Evidence of a statement which is made 
other than by a witness while testi-
fying at the hearing offered to prove 
the truth of the matter stated is 
hearsay evidence and is inadmissible 
except: 
(13) Writings offered as memoranda 
or records of acts, conditions or 
events to prove the facts stated 
therein, if the Judge finds that 
they were made in the regular course 
of a business at or about the time 
of the act, condition or event re-
corded, and that the sources of in-
formation from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
-14-
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It is app 0 llant's contention that the admission of finger-
r~int records undPr the Business Records Exception was reversible 
error. 
In the case of Pecole v. Zerbes, 6 Cal. 2d 425, 57 P.2d 
1319 (1936), the California Supreme Court ruled that where the 
state's fingerprint expert had not knovm the person fingerprinted 
personally and had not personally recorded the prints on the 
fingerprint card, his testimony was correctly excluded by the 
trial court as hearsay and the fingerprint card was properly 
rendered incompetent. The foundational requirements set forth 
by the court clearly exceed those requirements under the Business 
Records Exception, supra. Appellant respectfully submits that 
the Zerbes rule, applicable to the facts in this case, is sound 
judicial precedent which should be recognized and adopted by 
this court. 
III. EVEN ASSUMING FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS 
RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY 
RULE, THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN 
ADMITTING FINGERPRINT RECORDS 
BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION 
UNDER THAT EXCEPTION. 
If it was net error to admit the fingerprint card into 
evidence as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 63 (13) still 
requires that the presiding judge base the decision to admit 
0
" th" "trustworthiness" of the evidence offered. This trust-
-15-
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worthiness must be demonstrated to the court. 
Fingerprint evidence is certainly no more trusli·iorth. 
than other types of evidence such as weapons or narcotics. ~ 
fact that matter offered into evidence in support of the ct 
or defense of a party is logically relevant to the issues~ 
does not mean it is admissible. What may be relevant may b' 
rendered incompetent and inadmissible as to the rules of e·i,_ 
20 ALR 246. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Davie, 121 U~hli 
240 P. 2d 265 (1952) ruled that regular entries made in the c. 
of business are admissible in evidence only when proper foe:.: .. 
is laid in order to insure proof of the trustworthiness of: 
records submitted. The recognized Utah foundational standa'.. 
is that set forth in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
96 Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819 (1938). This case allowed the i:.: 
duction of business entries "made in the usual course of b~: 1 
introduced from proper custody, and upon a showing of genero 
authentication." Clayton also requires the offering party: 
show the necessity of admitting records without requirir.9' 
person making the entry to testify, the custody from whic~ · 
records were taken, and that the records were prepar~ ~t 
due course of the business' work. Foundation testimony of'.c 
by the state in the instant case does not meet even the stc'' 
required by State v. Davie, supra, and ~layton v. M~ 
Life Ins. Co., supra. 
-16-
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Therefore, the court failed even to require a sufficient 
foundation to assure that the comparative prints were, in fact, 
taken and maintained by the police as a "business record" as 
contemplated by the Utah Rules of Evidence. The admission of 
the prints was reversible error. 
TV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION 
LAID TO INSURE THE AUTHENTICITY 
OF THE FINGERPRINT CARD ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
Fingerprint evidence when competent, relevant and material 
and when presented by qualified experts, is admissible for the 
purpose of establishing the identity of an individual. People v. 
Van Cleave, 208 Cal. 295, 280 Pac. 983 (1929), Commonwealth v. 
Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E. ld 382 (1939) Cert. denied 
304 U.S. 562 (1939), State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 196 
(1918), Commonwealth v. Loomis, 270 Pa. 254, 113 Atl. 428 (1921) . 
Yet, to be competent the fingerprint evidence must be admitted 
only after sufficient foundation is laid by the State to authenti-
cate the fingerprint evidence admitted. 
The amount of authentication required should vary with 
the purpose of the evidentiary matter offered. State v. Suing, 
210 Kan. 363, 502 P. 2d 718 (1972). Where evidence is offered 
as a general representation, very slight proof of reliability 
may be sufficient, but where offered to prove individualized 
traits, much more convincing proof of dependability is required. 
-17-
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Fingerprint evidence is of the most delicate nature; 
it may be clearly developed, improved and intensified or ju~ 
as easily destroyed, dependent upon the equipment used, and 
the experience, interest, knowledge, skill and versatili~ct 
the persons working with it. 1 Therefore, convincing proof 
of authentication is essential. 
This theory is clearly supported by Professor Mccormic 
in his treatise on Evidence. 2d Ed., § 212: Demonstrative Ev:· 
dence, P. 524 wherein he states that when evidence is of such 
a nature as not to be readily identifiable or to be susceptit 
to alteration by tampering or ;::ontamination, a substantially 
more elaborate foundation for admissibility should be requin: 
Such foundation should track the chain of evidence with: "suE 
cient completeness to render it improbable that the original 
i tern has either been exchanged with another or been contamina: 
or tampered with." Id at P.254. 
Clearly analogous to the instant case are the fou~~~ 
and authentication standards required for the admission of ni 
co tics, based upon the destructible nature of the evidence it: 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 41 ' 
P. 2d 670 (1972), ruled in a prosecution for the sale of amphe> 
1 Walter Scott, ~ingerprint Mechanics, 
Charles c. Thomas, (1951) 
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that the circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody 
of th<~ physical objects or substances connected with the commi-
ssion 0f the alleged crime and the liklihood of tampering are 
factors to be considered in determining adrnissability. Further 
cases supporting the proposition that a continuous chain of 
custody is necessary for adrnissability of a controlled substance 
include Jackson v. State, 552 P.2d 1356, cert. denied 95 S.Ct. 
637 (1974), Ryder v. State, 513 P.2d 593 (1973), and People v. 
Atencio, 529 P.2d 636 (1974). 
Actual authentication is essential in this case since 
almost three years had passed since the taking, processing and 
classifying of the fingerprint card offered as primary evidence 
of appellant's guilt. Also, by Mr. Simpson's own testimony, 
he had no first-hand knowledge of the actual taking of prints 
placed on the card and his initial experience with the prints 
in question occurred when he classified them. Further, there 
is testimony that the envelope containing the fingerprint card 
had never been sealed. Without proper authentication as to 
the competency of the evidence as required under Rule 21 it 
is open to question whether the prints admitted into evidence 
were those of the appellant, or whether the chain of custody 
may have been broken during the three year period between the 
initial taking of the disputed prints in 1973 and the time of 
trial in 1976. 
It is again clear from the record that the foundation 
~id by thP State did not prove a chain of custody sufficient 
-19-
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to assure the authenticity or reliability of the prints. Tr 
admission of the prints by the Juvenile Court Judge constitt 
reversible error. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
In order to overcome a Motion to Dismiss, the State me 
have introduced evidence which, standing alone, is sufficie~: 
to prove appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
supra. In this case, the state's evidence only showed that: 
burglary and theft occurred. There was presented no substar.t 
evidence that the appellant was the perpetrator of the burgk 
or theft of the upstairs living portion of the victim's home, 
The question of whether or not the prosecution has sa: 
f ied its burden of proof can be analyzed in terms of an evici' 
tiary principle forwarded by Wigmore. 
"(The proposition) cannot be, 'Is there 
evidence?'. . Rather the proposition 
seems to be this: Are there facts in 
evidence which, if unanswered, would 
justify men of ordinary reason and fair-
ness in aff i:cming the question which the 
plaintiff is bound to maintain?'" 
9 Wigmore 3d Ed. Section 2494. 
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This principle has been recognized in Seybold v. Union Pac. Ry. co., 
121 Utah 6, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951); Continental Bank and Trust co. 
v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 892 and State v. Garcia, 
11 Utah 2d 167, 355 P. 2d 57 (1960). 
In State v. Garcia, supra, the court affirmed a conviction 
of first degree murder but in its opinion delineated that standard 
by which substantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt should be judged. The opinion stated: 
It is universally recognized that 
there is no . . question (for the 
trier of fact) without substantial 
evidence indicating defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This re-
quires evidence from which the . 
(trier of fact) could reasonably 
find the defendant guilty of all 
material issues of fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id at 59. 
The only evidence presented against the appellant is 
circumstantial as well as insubstantial in nature. Only one 
latent fingerprint identified as belonging to the appellant 
was taken in the area of the crime scene. The print was taken 
two days after the burglary. It was found on the outside surface 
of the window to a cellar disconnected from the area of the 
house which was burglarized and from which personal property 
was taken. The window had been tampered with during the two 
day period, contrary to police instructions. The print was 
then matched and found comparable to an unauthenticated finger-
print card identified as containing prints purportedly of the 
appellant. 
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The appellant contends that no trier of fact could Pa: 
ably and fairly have found the appellant guilty of burglary 
or theft beyond a reasonable doubt given the insubstantial _ 
dence presented by the state. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts, law and reasoning set forth hereir., 
the decision of the Second District Juvenile Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah should be reversed and Mr. Marque: 
should be granted an immediate release from the Utah State 
Ir.dustrial School. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~Yfl1a~ S T. MASSEY 
rnez for Appellant 
~ ~~ulc~1 1- t;-;1~ 
td ';kv-1/' 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a copy of the: 
going Brief of Appellant to the office of the Attorney Geneti. 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and WU 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 35229. S uth ·7- 00 West, Salt Lake c;: 
Utah 84119, this__;3;jdA... day of _, L , 1976. 
) 
&~c-0,ct't! (J_)t l L 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
